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Cyberbiosecurity is being proposed as a formal new enterprise which encompasses
cybersecurity, cyber-physical security and biosecurity as applied to biological and
biomedical-based systems. In recent years, an array of important meetings and public
discussions, commentaries and publications have occurred that highlight numerous
vulnerabilities. While necessary first steps, they do not provide a systematized structure
for effectively promoting communication, education and training, elucidation and
prioritization for analysis, research, development, test and evaluation and implementation
of scientific, technological, standards of practice, policy, or even regulatory or legal
considerations for protecting the bioeconomy. Further, experts in biosecurity and
cybersecurity are generally not aware of each other’s domains, expertise, perspectives,
priorities, or where mutually supported opportunities exist for which positive outcomes
could result. Creating, promoting and advancing a new discipline can assist with
formal, beneficial and continuing engagements. Recent key activities and publications
that inform the creation of Cyberbiosecurity are briefly reviewed, as is the expansion
of Cyberbiosecurity to include biomanufacturing which is supported by a rigorous
analysis of a biomanufacturing facility. Recommendations are provided to initialize
Cyberbiosecurity and place it on a trajectory to establish a structured and sustainable
discipline, forum and enterprise.
Keywords: cyberbiosecurity, bioeconomy, biosecurity, biomanufacturing, cybersecurity, cyber-physical security,
supply chain
INTRODUCTION
We propose “Cyberbiosecurity” as an emerging hybridized discipline at the interface of
cybersecurity, cyber-physical security and biosecurity. Initially, we define this term as
“understanding the vulnerabilities to unwanted surveillance, intrusions, andmalicious and harmful
activities which can occur within or at the interfaces of comingled life and medical sciences,
cyber, cyber-physical, supply chain and infrastructure systems, and developing and instituting
measures to prevent, protect against, mitigate, investigate and attribute such threats as it pertains
to security, competitiveness and resilience.” We emphasize this is an initial definition; we fully
expect that the definition and the landscape will rapidly evolve, requiring the definition to
be revised. We also contend that, because of its diversity and extent, cyberbiosecurity needs
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its own systematics, so that it can be better communicated,
organized, explored, advanced and implemented. Here, we also
posit that cyberbiosecurity contributes to a larger strategic
objective of “Safeguarding the Bioeconomy” (The National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine., 2014), a
concept advanced in the U.S., which seeks to increase security
and resilience of the Bioeconomy to protect its rapidly changing
cyber-life science topology.
Thus, far, what we are proposing to call cyberbiosecurity
has primarily been initiated out of two principal sets of
activities. The first activities involved a study (American
Association for the Advancement of Science et al., 2014)
and three workshops (The National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering and Medicine., 2014, 2015, 2016) which were
primarily focused on security issues with respect to “Big Data”
and the relationship with the “Bioeconomy.” The second set
was a first-ever systems analysis of a biomanufacturing facility
which expands the view to include a different “target set” and
approach to understanding vulnerabilities with sharp acuity.
This tasked study was conducted to comprehensively understand
the vulnerabilities with respect to a wide range of unwanted
intrusions and nefarious activities in the life science, cyber, cyber-
physical, infrastructure and supply chain aspects, and determine
what measures could be taken or developed and implemented
to anticipate, detect, identify, prevent, mitigate, respond to and
attribute such potential exploitations. The first published paper
on cyberbiosecurity primarily focuses on the security of the
biotechnology interface with cyberspace (Peccoud et al., 2017). In
addition to the system analysis as part of the second set, a small
workshop was held in the US that sought to scope and stimulate
interest in the government, academic, corporate and non-profit
sectors, create a core constituency, understand what topics and
themes could constitute cyberbiosecurity, identify priorities and
begin to develop a campaign and timeline. The workshop was
highly successful. These endeavors, together with additional
recent activities and publications (Kozminski and Drubin, 2015;
Pauwels and Vidyarthi, 2016, 2017; Pauwels and Dunlap, 2017),
have added to scoping the future of cyberbiosecurity yet to come.
BACKGROUND
Simply stated, since its inception biosecurity has been primarily
focused on reducing the risks associated with the misuse of
science which could cause harm to humans, animals, plants
and the environment through the creation, production and
deliberate or accidental release of infectious disease agents
or their byproducts (e.g., toxins). Cybersecurity has been
a separate field which has been primarily focused on the
security of information technology based systems, from personal
computers and communications devices to large infrastructures
and networks. Up until just the past few years, the “cyber”
overlaps with biosecurity have not been realized or fleshed
out. The important interrelationship between biosecurity and
cybersecurity is gaining increasing attention. We posit that the
two must work collaboratively, and will not be effective working
separately. Cyberbiosecurity actually started with thinking about
a particular set of problems being confronted by the life sciences.
As a result of our recent work, described below, other dimensions
are being added. Establishing a unifying discipline, crafting its
systematics and identifying an evolutionary path forward are
within reach.
The economic strength and growth of the United States
have been due to a culture and environment that foster
innovation. Those developments could not be possible without
significant contributions by science and engineering. The
intersection among economic growth and the biological sciences
contributions—the bioeconomy—has recently been recognized
as an important component of national security. For the
U.S., the Bioeconomy accounts for an estimated $4 trillion
annually, nearly 25% of the GDP. That contribution ranges
from pharmaceuticals to renewable energy, from environmental
remediation to public health resilience, and from agriculture
to response of emerging diseases. As part of the U.S. national
security architecture, “safeguarding the sciences” is a priority. In
doing so, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other
Federal Agencies also fulfill the U.S. obligation to the Biological
Toxins and Weapons Convention (BTWC) and compliance
to the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1540—preventing the misuse of biological material, technology,
and expertise and enforcement of the related statutes. The FBI
also sponsors and actively engages the International Genetically
Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition to inculcate a culture
of security among international students—emerging leaders of
research, industry, and policymaking. At the same time the
FBI works with U.S. policymakers (You, 2017) to redefine and
scope of the biosecurity spectrum for the Twenty first Century—
a century where there is unprecedented pace of biological
research and innovation, the use of diverse and large datasets—
Big Data—to answer global scientific and societal priorities
and opportunities. Concomitant to both realized and future
benefits and growth,With the life sciences becoming increasingly
digitized, and intellectual property protection, cyber intrusion,
the protection of personal medical and genomic information,
and the impacts on science, trade and commerce loom large.
Engagements with the science media (Kozminski and Drubin,
2015) and testimonies (You, 2017) have raised these issues to
advance both U.S. competitiveness and national security.
In 2014, the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS), FBI and the UnitedNations Interregional Crime
and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) published a report
entitled “National and Transnational Security Implications of
Big Data in the Life Sciences (American Association for the
Advancement of Science, et al., 2014). Briefly, this report starts
by helping to understand “Big Data”; massive, diverse data sets
that are created, reside, are analyzed and move in information
ecosystems. For the life sciences Big Data refers to datasets
including “raw data, combined data, or published data from
the health-care system, pharmaceutical industry, genomics and
other –omics fields, clinical research, environment, agriculture,
and microbiome efforts.” Further, they state that Big Data
also includes analytic technologies and outputs, such as from
“data integration, data mining, data fusion, image and speech
recognition, natural language processing, machine learning,
Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology | www.frontiersin.org 2 April 2018 | Volume 6 | Article 39
Murch et al. Cyberbiosecurity and Safeguarding the Bioeconomy
social media analysis, and Bayesian analysis.” A number of areas
that have drawn and need attention are pointed out, such as
the security of the cyber infrastructure and data repositories,
and the privacy and confidentiality of individuals. In our view,
their focus on the security risks of Big Data in the life sciences
falling into just two major categories, i.e., inappropriate access
to data and analytic technologies through vulnerabilities in
the data and cyber infrastructure; and, the use of Big Data
technologies to integrate current data and enable the design
of a harmful biological agent should be revisited and refined.
Thanks to this team’s efforts, not only do we have a useful
topology of Big Data, the beginnings of a structure for thinking
about security implications at the bio-cyber interface (Technical,
Legal, Institutional and Individual) and a set of high-level
recommendations for a path forward.
From 2014 to 2016, three workshops were organized by
the U.S. National Academies on behalf of the FBI under the
theme of “Safeguarding the Bioeconomy.” The first (TheNational
Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine., 2014) laid
the foundation for the next two. Presentations and discussions
focused on the security implications of the convergence in
the life and chemical sciences with physical, mathematical,
computational, engineering, and social and behavioral sciences.
In addition to broader contexts, two specific technologies
received focus: neuromorphic computing and 3-D bioprinting.
The second workshop (The National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering and Medicine., 2015) introduced a range of new
threats to and vulnerabilities of the Bioeconomy which at
the time had not received focused consideration with respect
to U.S. “competiveness, security, economic growth and global
leadership in research and innovation.” This workshop was
built on three major themes: The Role of Informatics in
the Bioeconomy, Criminal Threats and Vulnerabilities in
the Existing and Near-Future Bioeconomy and Securing and
Flourishing the Bioeconomy for the Future. Rapid growth
of this sector creates increasing security risks to proprietary
materials and informatics, industrial espionage and data hacks
are increasing in frequency, and traditional security measures
are increasingly ineffective. Still, alternative and adaptive security
measures could be implemented even with the inherent openness
of emerging technologies upon which the Bioeconomy is
dependent.Workshop participants not only providedmore detail
on the threats and vulnerabilities but also both comprehensive
categories and specific approaches that could be taken to
address the problems and concerns identified. The third
workshop (The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering
and Medicine., 2016) principally focused on data generation
and access with respect to the Bioeconomy within several
categories of both clinical and non-clinical data, from the
perspectives of Biosecurity, Data Policy and Regulation, Future
Implications, Technology Advances, Data Sovereignty and
Sharing, Cybersecurity and International Implications. Taken
together, these events significantly expanded the view of what the
emerging discipline of cyberbiosecurity could encompass.
Pauwels and her co-authors also raise important concerns
and recommendations for the security of biotechnology in
cyberspace. In the first, she and Vidyarthi (Pauwels and
Vidyarthi, 2016) raise concerns over data breaches of health
care information and what it means for the biotechnology
industry. Protecting digital DNA and personal medical
information is highlighted and the fact that a then recent
U.S. Presidential cybersecurity initiative put significant resources
into shoring up cyberinfrastructure. Unfortunately, the need
for improvements to protecting the Bioeconomy, which is
heavily dependent on information systems and infrastructure,
was not recognized. The report outlined the implications of not
protecting the Bioeconomy dimension. Their recommendations
were primarily focused on protecting genomic data. In the
second report, Pauwels and Dunlap (2017) go into more depth
framing potential cyber-vulnerabilities for specific types of
biotechnologies: genome-editing; DNA assembly, synthesis and
printing; portable genomic sequencers; artificial intelligence
for understanding biological complexity; autonomous systems
and robotics in cloud labs; and, lab-on-a-chip and microfluidic
technologies all of which have cyber-physical interfaces.
These authors also suggest governance systems and policy
recommendations which might be harnessed to address the
lab-focused concerns they raise.
Other recent publications also highlight the complexity
of the enterprise we are terming “Cyberbiosecurity” and
concerns over security, robustness and resiliency. These include
security of personal genomic data when foreign companies
that have purchased all or part of U.S. companies or have
been contracted for genomic or health care data services which
provides access to sensitive personal information (Pauwels and
Vidyarthi, 2017), the continuing vulnerability of electronic
health records (Weise, 2015) and health care systems (Hackett,
2015; Winton, 2016; Griffin, 2017), imposing control over
DNA sequencing through DNA-encoded malware (Greenberg,
2017), synthetic biology supply chain vulnerabilities (Frazer
et al., 2017), cyber compromise of large industrial biopharma
(Collier, 2017; Shaban and Nakashima, 2017), and high-level
studies which are systematically examining U.S. biodefense
programs and capabilities (The Blue Ribbon Study Panel on
Biodefense, 2015; Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, 2017). The Dark Web/Dark Net (Beckett, 2009;
Interpol, 2015; Langewiesche, 2016) could be included as it
interfaces with dual use life science endeavors and biopharma
research, development, intellectual property and products and
compromise of the integrity of critical life science and health
cyber-supported technologies and infrastructures. Because of
the reliance on bioinformatics, the security of synthetic DNA
could also be included, as well (Adam et al., 2011). Clearly,
this rapidly expanding galaxy does needs a universally accepted
definition, common terms of reference, and defined boundaries
and structure for best value, ordered evolution and impact.
ADDING ANOTHER DIMENSION:
CYBERBIOSECURITY SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
OF A BIOMANUFACTURING FACILITY
Now we add another dimension to cyberbiosecurity, and
take an approach that we posit that should be incorporated
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with other aspects discussed earlier. The biopharma industry
itself has its own substantial equities and investments in
the research, development, production and sale of vaccines,
therapeutics and prophylactics for the global market. The U.S.
Government has substantial investments in the development
and production of critical vaccines and biotherapeutics for
both civilian and military purposes. Concomitantly, experts
are increasingly recognizing that biomanufacturing itself is
potentially vulnerable to unwanted or illicit activities which
could result in damaging outcomes. These could include the
theft of intellectual property, disruption of the supply chain,
manipulation of the bioprocess development and bioproduction,
cyberattacks on key information technology components and
cyberphysical interfaces, the corruption of critical data and
manipulation of security systems and infrastructure upon which
secure and safe facility operations are dependent. Our sponsor
was not interested in generalizations or esoteric approximations
about the security vulnerabilities of a biomanufacturing
facility but wanted a comprehensive, detailed, actionable
analysis.
Thus, we undertook an in-depth, multidimensional analysis
of an existing biomanufacturing facility to identify security
gaps and vulnerabilities, make recommendations with respect to
addressing those identified and projected and set the stage for
more specific and comprehensive measures to be undertaken,
whether they exist or have to be developed and validated. The
systems analysis approach used was designed to assess the state
of security at present, determine what an acceptable state of
security would be, and provide guidance and recommendations
to take the facility from its current state to the desired
state.
The bioprocess development/bioproduction facility used as
the “test bed” for this analysis designs, develops and produces
clinical trial quantities of protein-based biotherapeutics and
the associated documentation for commercial and government
clients. If the outputs from this “test bed”meet client expectations
and the client receives government approval, the client scales up
production and the product is marketed. This facility was studied
as a system, consisting of four key, interrelated subsystems:
end-to-end bioprocess development/biomanufacturing;
the supply chain; the supporting information systems
infrastructure and cyber-physical interfaces with bioprocess
development and biomanufacturing; and, facility infrastructure
including its relationship to the facility’s host infrastructure.
The systems analysis was a phased process with project
management methods applied. The facility or any of its
components or operations were not compromised, corrupted
or altered during this project in any manner or form.
Rather, it was studied thoroughly yet benignly. The analysis
included human factors and “downstream” considerations,
as well.
The systems aspects of a biomanufacturing facility which
are potentially vulnerable to security threats and the solutions
required are summarized in Figure 1.
Due to space limitations, we provide only a top-level view of
the analysis. Key overarching findings include:
• Vulnerabilities can exist across the entire system, from
bioprocess development and GMP to supply chain, to cyber-
physical and infrastructure; there are potentially more than
one might anticipate a priori.
• Successful exploitation of vulnerabilities can occur through
passive and active means for passive and active purposes,
depending upon adversaries’ intentions, objectives, accesses,
knowledge and resources, and outcomes sought.
• Exploitation of some vulnerabilities require direct access to
facilities or components; personnel and physical security
aspects should not be overlooked.
• Adversaries can use combinations and sequences of methods
and targeting, both subtle and not, to attempt to and achieve
their objectives.
• The operational capabilities of adversaries, not just technical,
must be considered and accounted for in planning for and
implementing security measures.
We emphasize that, while there are general principles that apply
and observations that will derive from such analyses, the analysis
design and execution and the resulting solution set, should be
tailored on a facility-by-facility basis. We note that the defensive
areas noted may not be singular, but require combinations
of defensive approaches and techniques to be identified and
implemented to ensure optimal security robustness.
What is considerably important from this analysis is that
a rigorous study of a facility such as this can result in the
identification and characterization of discrete vulnerabilities,
gaps, shortfalls and opportunities for which readily-available
solutions can be implemented, or otherwise can be developed,
tested and implemented. We did not conduct detailed studies
regarding how genomics can be compromised as it relates to
biomanufacturing, because we were directed not to but are well
aware of plausible scenarios and what the effects could be.
Our analysis demonstrates that biomanufacturing facilities
can benefit from comprehensive, multidisciplinary analyses to
identify security vulnerabilities leading to solutions to mitigate
or address them. This, in turn, raises the prospect of the
development and validation of a set of methods or protocols
would be in order which could be used by facility staff or external
service providers to shore up individual facilities from Do-It-
Yourself to large Biopharma. Walking this out, guidelines or
standards could be developed, established and accepted to ensure
consistency and quality of the analyses conducted, the credentials
of the personnel doing so and the quality and effectiveness
of measures undertaken. While sophisticated adversaries could
design and execute sophisticated attacks, it is likely in many
instances that relatively straightforward methods and practices
could raise the bar considerably to reduce risk. Lastly, combining
analyses of this sort could be used as a basis for informed
investments in research, development, test and evaluation for
solutions to the most worrisome current and future threats.
MOVING CYBERBIOSECURITY FORWARD
Many other critical cyber-enabled life science and biomedical
technologies, systems and applications naturally lend themselves
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FIGURE 1 | A systems view of protecting a biomanufacturing facility. For each defensive set identified, multiple threats and impacts were identified and potentially
more than one pathway or technique could be used by an adversary to achieve their objectives. GMP, Good Manufacturing Practice; IT, Information Technology; IS,
Information Systems; VPN, Virtual Private Network; IP, Intellectual Property.
to inclusion within Cyberbiosecurity. These include, but are
not limited to, personalized genomics, and medical and fitness
technologies, 3-D printing of critical personalized medical
devices, and medical laboratory and surgical robotics. A more
comprehensive system is warranted. Cyberbiosecurity could
be expanded to include cyber-bio systems within agriculture
and farm-to-table food production, processing and distribution
systems, and within natural resource and environmental
management. Direct and ordered engagements of the pertinent
sectors of the life sciences - biosecurity and cyber-cybersecurity
communities, should occur. Academia, industry, government or
non-profits (including policy, regulatory and legal experts) need
to begin to learn to communicate with and educate each other,
harmoniously identify and develop priorities, opportunities
and specify “next steps.” A major opportunity exists right
now to propose a unified structure and common vernacular.
Lastly, while definition and assemblage of Cyberbiosecurity is
occurring, national or international strategies should be pursued
to harmonize the emerging enterprise and foster measurable
value, success and sustainability.
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